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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ST.\TE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
JAMES EDWARD BRYAN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 10065 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ST.-\TEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, James Edward Bryan, has appealed from 
his conviction of the crime of automobile homicide in viola-
tion of Section 76-30-7.4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
after jury trial in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake 
County. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
By information filed by the District Attorney, Third 
Judicial District, the appellant was charged with crime of 
automobile homicide. Trial was had upon the charges on 
September 16-18, 1963, upon a jury trial with the Honor-
able Ray VanCott, Judge, presiding. The jury returned a 
verdict of guilty of the crime as charged and notice of 
appeal was filed on the 14th day of November, 1963. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, State of Utah, submits that the appellant's 
conviction should be affirmed by this court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant submits the following statement of facts 
as being those relevant and material to the only issue raised 
on appeal. 
On June 1, 1963, the appellant, operating a 1960 red 
Chevrolet automobile, drove the vehicle into the rear of 
a flatbed truck at 3965 South State Street in Salt Lake 
County at approximately 11:05 p.m. The appellant was 
the driver of the vehicle and his wife and two other persons 
were passengers in the vehicle ( R. 57, 58) . The appellant's 
wife and the two passengers died as a result of the collision. 
The appellant was charged with having killed Charles Wil-
liam Studham ( R. 1 ) , a passenger in the vehicle. 
Deputy Sheriff Pete Kutulas arrived at the accident 
scene about 11 : 06 p.m. ( R. 57) . The appellant was sitting 
outside his car on the curb ( R. 58) . The officer examined 
the passengers and indicated that the female passenger in 
the front seat appeared to be dead (R. 58). The impact of 
the collision of the appellant's car with the flatbed truck 
caused the latter vehicle to strike a third car owned by a 
Mr. Bermer (R. 59). There were no injuries to persons in 
the Bermer vehicle. Officer Kutulas found a whiskey bottle 
in the appellant's vehicle and arranged to have the appel-
lant taken to the hospital (R. 72). Officer Gary Steinfeldt, 
also a deputy sheriff, arrived at the scene of the accident at 
approximately the same time as Officer Kutulas. He ob-
served the appellant sitting on the curb with his head in a 
handkerchief (R. 212). At one point the appellant at-
tempted to stand, and fell down again. Officer Steinfeldt 
111o 
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asked the appellant if he were injured, and the appellant re-
plied that he was drunk ( R. 213). Officer Steinfeldt indi-
cated there was a strong odor of alcohol on the appellant's 
breath (R. 234). Officer Kutulas, who saw the appellant 
at the Salt Lake County Hospital, also detected a heavy 
odor of alcohol and was of the opinion that he was drunk 
(R. 7'2, 74). 
While the appellant was at the Salt Lake County Hos-
pital, Officer Steinfeldt advised the appellant that he was 
under arrest and said that he would like to take one of three 
tests to determine the appellant's intoxication, and recom-
mended a blood test ( R. 21 7) . Officer Steinfeldt testified 
(R. 216): 
"In further talking to the defendant I believe I asked him if he had 
been drinking. To this question I received an affirmative answer. 
Oh yes, I think I also told him that in circumstances such as this 
that we usually ask for a person that had been driving a car and 
had been drinking to submit to one of three tests for the purpose of 
finding out if he was driving the vehicle under the influence of 
alcohol; that one of those three tests could determine if he was 
over the specific amount of .150. I think I also asked him if he 
understood the process that I was explaining to him. He said-
yes, that he did understand what I was talking to him about. I 
told him that I was placing him under arrest, that he had the 
choice of a blood analysis, a urine analysis, or a breathilyzer test, 
and that I would like to suggest the blood analysis because we 
were at the hospital. This is where we obtain this and it would be 
most expedient to have it. I asked him if he would take one of 
those- specifically, the one that I had suggested. He said he 
would." 
Thereafter, Officer Steinfeldt had a nurse or social worker 
come over and verify the appellant's willingness to submit 
to a blood test. He testified ( R. 218) : 
"I took the vial back and stood by the defendant and called either 
one of the nurses' aides or social workers. Now I do not know 
which the terminology of the woman down there is. She is an 
assistant down there. 
* * * 
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"I asked her to come over with the paper and to witness the asking 
of the defendant if he would submit to a blood test. She came 
over. I asked the defendant if he would submit to a blood test 
that I wished to draw a sample from him, or have a sample fro~ 
him and he said, 'Yes.' The witness signed the paper, I also signed 
the paper. There is a special form down there that they have." 
At the time Officer Steinfeldt had the appellant submit 
to a blood test, he did not know that the passengers of the 
appellant's vehicle were dead (R. 238). It was Officer 
Steinfeldt's opinion when he saw the appellant at the acci-
dent scene and at the hospital that the appellant was drunk 
( R. 239, 24 7). On cross examination, Officer Steinfeldt 
indicated that he thoroughly advised the appellant of the 
nature of the request for a blood test and the consequences 
of his refusal to take such a test ( R. 249) . He further ad- l ~ 
hered to his position that the nurse or assistant had also 
obtained a consent from the appellant (R. 252). 
Officer Donald R. Fox testified that while at the hos-
pital, the attending physician asked the appellant if he 
would submit to a blood test. He testified (R. 273): 
"The Doctor asked Mr. Bryan if he would submit to the blood 
alcohol test and Mr. Bryan said, 'Yes.' " 
The testimony of Dr. Richard S. Joseph was read into 
evidence as it was received at the time of the preliminary 
hearing (R. 271). Dr. Joseph testified that when he ex-
amined the appellant, he was alert and showed no signs of 
any "neurological disorder" and that he withdrew blood 
from the appellant for the purposes of a blood alcohol test. ~ 
This apparently occurred after Officer Steinfeldt had ob- ~~' 
tained the appellant's consent. According to the Doctor, 
the appellant did not object (R. 285) although his com-
pliance was reluctant ( R. 295) . 
A chemist from the office of the State Chemist testified ~~ 
that the appellant's blood alcohol level was .24 7 per cent. 
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Under the provisions of 41-6--44, a blood alcohol level of 
.150 results in a presumption of intoxication. The trial court 
allowed the evidence of the blood alcohol test to be re-
ceived against the appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN AL-
LOWING THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE APPEL-
LANTS BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST TO BE RECEIVED IN 
EYIDENCE BECAUSE IT WAS NOT SECURED AS A RESULT 
OF ANY ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE SINCE: 
A. THE TEST WAS CONSENTED TO AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
B. THE TEST WAS CONSENTED TO AS A MATTER OF 
FACT. 
C. THE TEST WAS PROPERLY TAKEN INCIDENT TO 
A VALID ARREST BECAUSE THE ARREST OF THE 
ACCUSED WAS MADE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES 
(1) CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE, (2) STAT-
UTORILY PERMISSIBLE. 
D. THE SEARCH WAS PERMISSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE 
NATURE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED IN 
THE INSTANT CASE AND HAVING BEEN MADE 
UPON REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE A 
CRIME HAD BEEN COMMITTED . 
.\. THE TEST WAS CONSENTED TO AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The appellant in this case has argued that the blood test 
performed by law enforcement officials and members of the 
State Chemist's Office should not have been admitted in 
evidence because the blood, upon which the test was based, 
was extracted from the appellant in violation of his consti-
tutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution, prohibiting unlawful searches and 
seizures. It is submitted that there is no merit to the ap-
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pellant's position in that he consented as a matter of law 
to having been given a blood test. 41-6-44.10, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, provides: 
" (a) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state shall 
be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test of his 
breath, blood or urine for the purpose of determining the alco-
holic content of his blood, provided that such test is administered 
at the direction of a police officer having reasonable grounds to 
believe such person to have been driving in an intoxicated condi-
tion and in accordance with the rules and regulations established 
by the department." 
In the instant case, the evidence disclosed the appellant 
to have been operating his motor vehicle on the highways of 
the State of Utah. The police officer, under whose direction 
the blood test was administered, had reasonable grounds 
upon which to believe that the appellant had been operat-
ing his vehicle while in an intoxicated condition. The ob-
vious reasonable grounds are the accident, appellant's state-
ment that he was drunk, the odor of his breath, the slurry 
speech, and other factors indicative of intoxication. The 
United States Supreme Court, in Zap v. The United States, 
328 U.S. 624 ( 1946), upheld the inspection of an individ-
ual's books where there had been a contract between the 
individual and the United States under a cost-plus-fixed-fee 
contract and where both the statute and the contract pro-
vided for the inspection. In numerous other instances the 
concept of an automatic waiver, pursuant to statute has 
been recognized. In Varon, Searches, Seizures and Immu-
nities, Vol. 1 ( 1961), page 228, it is stated: 
"It becomes evident that an automatic waiver of this privilege 
is either made in advance by the individual in exchange for a 
license to do business, by way of contractual agreement, or by 
operation of law in types of businesses that are coupled with a 
public interest." 
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In that work, the concept of automatic statutory waiver is 
discussed and it is recognized as a valid basis upon which to 
predicate a search. 
In Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957), the 
United States Supreme Court was concerned with whether 
or not the extraction of blood from an unconscious motorist 
violated the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. 
It held that it did not. Although the court was not con-
cerned with search and seizure as the exclusionary rule, 
t\1 app v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ( 1961), had not as yet been 
announced; however, the court noted in Footnote 2, at page 
451, of the opinion: 
"It might be a fair assumption that a driver on the highways, 
in obedience to a policy of the State, would consent to have a blood 
test made as a part of a sensible and civilized system protecting 
himself as well as other citizens not only from the hazards of the 
road due to drunken driving, but also from some use of dubious 
lay testimony. In fact, the State of Kansas has by statute declared 
that any person who operates a motor vehicle on the public high-
ways of that State shall be deemed to have given his consent to 
submit to a chemical test of his breath, blood, urine, or saliva for 
the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood. If, 
after arrest for operation of a motor vehicle while under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor, the arresting officer has reasonable 
grounds for the arrest, and the driver refuses to submit to the test, 
the arresting officer must report this fact to the proper official who 
shall suspend the operator's permit. Kan Gen Stat, 1949 (Supp 
1955), § 8-1001 through§ 8-1007." 
In the instant case, the police officer taking the test com-
plied with the requirements of the statute and with the de-
cisions of this court in Ringwood v. The State, 8 U.2d 287, 
333 P.2d 943 ( 1959) and Bean v. The State, 12 U.2d 76, 
362 P.2d 750 ( 1961) .1 
1 1t is the position of the State that the statutory consent is to having any 
one of the tests in the statute given and that the failure to offer a particular test 
does not vitiate the statutory consent nor prohibit the use of the evidence 
thereby obtained but that the failure to offer the three tests would prohibit the 
revocation of a driver's license. 
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Goff, Constitutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests 
to Determine Intoxication) 49 Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology and Police Science ( 1958) , early discussed the 
problems attendant to applying consent statutes. The au-
thor of that article notes, at page 65, with reference to im-
plied consent statutes: 
"* * * Indications are, however, that the courts will favor it 
and, by so doing, will strengthen the statutes which prohibit driv-
ing while under the influence of alcohol." 
Additionally, almost all states which have considered 
the propriety of consent statutes similar to 41-6-44.10, 
U.C.A. 1953, have upheld their constitutionality as against 
challenges that the statute violated federal constitutional 
rights. 88 A.L.R.2d 1064, 1068. 
The concept of consent by statute, pursuant to the grant 
of a privilege, is in no way contrary to constitutional prin-
ciples. Manchester Press Club v. State Liquor Commission, 
89 N.H. 442, 200 A. 407 (1938). As was noted in the 
Breithaupt case, supra, the substantial interest of a state in 
protecting the health, safety and welfare of its citizens on its 
highways justifies such reasonable conditions on the privi-
lege of driving. Reasonable conditions on privileges have 
been recognized in many instances and it has been held rea-
sonable as a condition precedent to entering upon a mili-
tary installation that the individual consent to the search 
of his person or motor vehicle. Judge Advocate General 
Activities 1952/3135, 2 Dig. Ops., Search and S., § 11.5; 
J.A.G.A. 1953/1738, 3 Dig. Ops., Search and S., § 11.1; 
J.A.G.A. 1952/4398, 2 Dig. Ops., Mil. Pers., § 20.1; 
J.A.G.A. 1952/8326, 3 Dig. Ops., Posts,§ 23.1. 
Consequently, it is submitted that the plain language of 
41-6-44.10, U.C.A. 1953, operated as a consent as a matter 
'•' 
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of law to the extraction of the appellant's blood for the pur-
poses of a blood alcohol test. 2 
B. THE TEST WAS CONSENTED TO AS A MATTER OF FACT. 
It is submitted that the appellant consented to the blood 
test as a matter of actual fact. It is well settled that an 
accused can consent to a search of his person. The Federal 
Law on Search and Seizure, F.B.I., 1962, p. 70; johnson v. 
Zcrbst, 304 U.S. 458 ( 1938). The appellant in the instant 
case was thoroughly advised by the arresting sheriff of his 
rights under the law. Although he was placed under arrest 
by the officer, in accordance with the statutory mandate of 
·H-6-44.10, he was not being subjected to any pressure of 
any kind and was being given medical treatment by attend-
ing physicians. The officer requested the appellant's con-
sent and the appellant freely gave it. Thereafter, to insure 
that consent was properly obtained, the officer asked a 
nurse's aide or attendant to verify the fact that the appel-
lant had consented to the blood test. The nurse asked the 
appellant if he did in fact consent and received a positive 
reply. Finally, prior to the time the doctor made the extrac-
tion, he again asked the appellant if he consented to the 
blood test. The doctor testified that although the appellant 
was reluctant, he made no protest and his reluctance was 
only a matter of his attitude towards the test and was not in 
any way based upon a vocal protest or a belligerent attitude 
of any kind. The doctor further indicated that the appellant 
was in full possession of his faculties at the time the extrac-
tion was made. 
2 In Opinion 62-058, the Attorney General ruled that 41-6-44.10 oper-
ated as an implied consent statute, allowing a blood test to be taken on an 
unconscious individual where the officer has reasonable cause to believe the 
individual has been operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. 
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The mere fact that an accused is under arrest at the time 
he consents to a search of his person or property does not 
prima facie make the search non-consentual. People v. 
Rodriguez, 168 Cal. App. 2d 452, 336 P.2d 266 ( 1959); 
People v. Faulkner, 166 Cal. App. 2d 446, 333 P.2d 251 
( 1958) ; State v. Hoffman, 392 P.2d 237 (Wash. 1964). 
The question of whether or not a particular person con-
sents or does not consent to a search is a question of fact. 
State v. H offman,supra; People v. Torres, 158 Cal. App. 2d 
213, 322 P.2d 300 ( 1958) ; People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 
291 P.2d 469 ( 1955). Certainly, the facts in this instance 
would support a determination that the search was con-
sentual. The appellant was a mature individual, not being 
subjected to any brutality, trickery or fraud, who was in .-
full possession of his faculties. In Davis, Federal Searches 
and Seizures, p. 173 ( 1964), it is stated: 
"If officers clearly explain an individual's constitutional rights, 
there is little doubt that the waiver is made intelligently." 
In State v. Plas, 391 P.2d 867 (Nev. 1964), the Nevada 
Supreme Court noted: 
"Whether in a particular case an apparent consent to a search 
without a warrant was voluntarily given is a question of fact. So 
far as appears from the record the respondent, without any force 
or coercion on the part of the officer who was questioning him, 
freely consented to the search of his automobile which disclosed 
the evidence he since has claimed was illegally obtained. In fact 
respondent admits that no actual threat was made to induce the 
consent. Under the facts of this case, a holding that as a matter of 
law respondent's consent was given because of an unlawful asser-
tion of authority by the officer would be unjustified. People v. 
Burke, 47 Cal. 2d 45,301 P.2d 241. 
"Although searches and seizures made without a proper war-
rant are often to be regarded as unreasonable and in violation of 
the federal constitution, the obtaining of the warrant may be 
waived by the individual; he may give his consent in the search 
and seizure. Such waiver and consent, freely and intelligently 
given, converts a search and seizure which otherwise would be '·· "·'~ 
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unlawful into a lawful search and seizure. United States v. 
\litrhell, 322 U.S. 65, 64 S.Ct. 896, 88 L.Ed. 1140; Brainard v. 
United States, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 121,220 F.2d 384; Judd v. United 
States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 64, 190 F.2d 649. The mere fact that the 
consent was given while respondent was in the custody of a police 
officer does not render the consent involuntary. United States v. 
\litrhell, supra." 
This court recognized as much in State v. Louden, 15 U.2d 
64, 387 P.2d 240 ( 1963). In State v. Tigue, 95 Ariz. 45, 
386 P.2d 402 ( 1963), the Arizona Supreme Court upheld 
a search where police officers stopped the appellant's car, 
noted that his eyes appeared watery and bloodshot, and 
that the driver of the vehicle smelled of alcohol. The officers 
searched the accused and recovered evidence leading to the 
accused's conviction. The Arizona Supreme Court noted, 
at page404: 
"The constitutional protection against unreasonable search 
may be waiwd by unequivocal words or conduct expressing con-
sent. People v. Sullivan, 214 A.C.A. 432, 29 Cal.Rptr. 515. Com-
petent evidence in this case indicates that defendant Schipper in-
vited a search. The officer who made the search testified: 
"'I talked with him for awhile. We just visited and then 
I asked him if he had anything on him that he shouldn't have, 
and he told me no, he didn't- go ahead- and held his arms 
up. And at that time I searched him and found the monies.' 
(Emphasis supplied.)" 
See also State v. Marshall, 380 P.2d 799 (Ore. 1963). In 
that case the Oregon Supreme Court noted that proof of 
wai\·er of constitutional protection from unreasonable 
search and seizure need not be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt but need only be shown by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 
The evidence in the instant case, when viewed in light 
of all the circumstances, including the accused's age, the 
admonition of the officer and the inquiry of the nurse and 
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doctor, support a conclusion that the consent to the blood 
test was given as a matter of fact. 
C. THE TEST WAS PROPERLY TAKEN INCIDENT TO A 
VALID ARREST BECAUSE THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED 
WAS MADE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES (1) CONSTITU-
TIONALLY PERMISSIBLE, (2) STATUTORILY PERMIS- .,,. 
SIBLE. 
( 1) It is well settled that a search may be made incident 
to a valid arrest. United States v. RabinowitzJ 339 U.S. 56 
(1950); United States v. HarrisJ 331 U.S. 145 (1947); 
Ker v. CaliforniaJ 374 U.S. 23 ( 1963); State v. Dodge, 12 
Utah 2d 293, 365 P.2d 798 ( 1961). The appellant con-
tends that the blood test taken in the instant case was im-
properly admitted because the officer arrested the accused 
for a misdemeanor, to wit: driving while intoxicated, when 
such a misdemeanor was not committed in the presence of 
the arresting officer. 77-13-2, U.C.A. 1953, requires that 
before an officer can arrest for a misdemeanor, the offense 
must be committed or attempted in the presence of the 
officer. Oleson v. PincockJ 68 Utah 507,251 Pac. 23 ( 1926). 
However, the Court is concerned in this case not with the 
validity of an arrest for false arrest purposes, but with 
validity of an arrest for purposes of allowing evidence to be 
received against the accused without violating constitu-
tional rights. (The true question is whether or not an arrest 
made on the basis of reasonable and probable cause to 
believe a crime has been committed is constitutionally 
proper in a misdemeanor case so that evidence so obtained 
may be received. What standard is constitutionally applica-
ble? In Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and The Law of 
ArrestJ 54 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and 
Police Science 393, 406 ( 1963) it is stated: 
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"Thus is is clear from both the search and arrest cases that the 
Fourth Amendment applies the standard of probable cause to de-
termine the validity of an arrest made without a warrant ... " 
Sec also Davis, Federal Searches and Seizures, Chapter 7 
( 1964). 
In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 ( 1925) the 
Supreme Court allowed a search made on probable cause 
where the individual was engaged in the commission of a 
misdemeanor, thus recognizing that police officers are held 
to no higher standard of constitutional requirement in a 
misdemeanor case than in a felony case. In Leagre, supra, 
54 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Sci-
ence 393, 405 ( 1963) notes: 
"It would seem to follow a fortiori that the right to arrest without 
warrant for lesser offences than felonies and breaches of the peace 
is constitutionally permissible." 
See also Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 NW, 
U.L. Rev. 16, 17-18 ( 1957). 
Consequently, an arrest based on probable cause, al-
though contrary to State law, would be constitutionally 
unobjectionable and the evidence obtained from such an 
arrest would be admissible. United States v. Snyder, 278 
Fed. 650 ( 1922); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 
( 1946). If the arrest is constitutionally proper, the evi-
dence obtained by search incident to such arrest is admissi-
ble. State l'. Dodge, supra. Is the fact that a state statute 
may require a more severe standard for a legal arrest a 
basis for excluding evidence where the arrest was constitu-
tionally sound? It is submitted not, unless the state as a 
matter of its own judicial policy chooses to apply an exclu-
sionary rule under such circumstances. Utah does not apply 
such a rule. Although recognizing itself bound to follow the 
exclusionary rule by virtue of M app v. Ohio, supra, this 
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court recognized in State v. Louden, supra, that prior Utah 
cases had not adopted the exclusionary rule where state 
policy was involved. State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 Pac. 
704 ( 1923); State v. Fair, 10 Utah 2d 365, 353 P.2d 615 
( 1960) . Therefore, the evidence in the instant case was 
admissible since it was constitutionally obtained and Utah 
does not as a matter of state policy apply the exclusionary 
rule where federal constitutional issues are not involved.3 
( 2) It is submitted that the arrest in the instant case can 
be sustained, and thereby the search incident thereto, on 
the basis that the arrest was proper under statutes of this 
state. In the instant case at the time the officers arrived 
upon the scene, the accused was obviously intoxicated. As 
he started to walk, he fell down and he told the officer that 
he was drunk. Officer Pete Kutulas, one of the investigating 
officers, indicated that the accused was committing the 
offense of public intoxication (R. 80). It is immaterial that 
the arrest for the offense which was committed in the offi-
cer's presence, to wit, public intoxication, was delayed until 
the accused was taken to the hospital. Dailey v. United 
States, 261 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. den. 359 U.S. 
969; Carlo v. United States, 286 F.2d 841 (2nd Cir. 1961), 
cert. den. 336 U.S. 944; Davis, Federal Searches and Sei-
zures, ( 1964) § 3.231. Therefore, the officers, at the time 
they first observed the accused, observed him committing 
an offense in their presence. 32-7-13, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, makes it a misdemeanor for a person to "be in 
an intoxicated condition in a public place." The appellant 
was in an intoxicated condition, sitting on the curbing in 
the vicinity of 39th South and State Streets in Salt Lake 
County. Officer Steinfeldt testified that he arrested the 
3 Assuming for arguments sake that the evidence is not otherwise admissible 
vis a vis consent, or incident to a lawful arrest under State law, etc. 
t: 
•• : J 
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accused in the hospital for the offense of driving while in-
toxicated. The fact that the officer arrests an individual for 
one offense does not necessarily vitiate the arrest if he other-
w isc had sufficient grounds to arrest for another offense. 
Thus, in State v. Tigue, 95 Ariz. 45, 386 P.2d 402 ( 1963), 
the Arizona court stated: 
"* * * Nevertheless, the test regarding the legality of a search 
and seizure is whether it was 'reasonable' under the circumstances, 
and the courts have held that circumstances beyond the fact that 
there was an arrest might justify a search and seizure which other-
wise would be unreasonable." 
Implicit, therefore, in the Arizona court's opinion, is the 
concept that all the facts available to the officers must be 
looked at to determine whether their conduct was reason-
able. The fact that the officers mislabeled the particular 
offense for which the arrest was made is immaterial. 
Secondly, it is submitted that in the case of driving in 
an intoxicated condition, the police officers may arrest, even 
though the offense is not committed in their presence and is 
a mere misdemeanor, if they have reasonable grounds to 
believe the person has in fact been driving in an intoxicated 
condition. 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, pro-
vides that a blood alcohol test may be taken if the police 
officer has reasonable grounds to "believe such person has 
been driving in an intoxicated condition." The statute fur-
ther provides that if the individual is placed under arrest 
and has been requested to submit to "any one of the above" 
tests and refuses, it shall not be given. The statute seems to 
contemplate that at the time the officer requests the accused 
to submit to a blood test, the accused will be under arrest. 
Since the statute allows the blood test to be taken on reason-
able grounds, it follows that the statute contemplates that 
the arrest will be made upon the showing of reasonable 
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grounds. As noted above, there is nothing unconstitutional 
about allowing an arrest for a misdemeanor on the basis of 
reasonable grounds to believe the offense has been com-
mitted. The Legislature, obviously aware of the problem of 
the drunk driver, intended to authorize an arrest for driving 
while intoxicated under circumstances more liberal than 
in the case of other misdemeanors. The officer in the instant 
case complied completely with the provisions of the statute. 
This being so, the arrest was proper and the search incident 
thereto appropriate. In People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal. 2d 
766, 312 P.2d 690 ( 1957), the California Supreme Court 
upheld the extraction of blood from an accused after he was 
taken to the hospital following an automobile accident. The 
accused was charged with drunk driving causing personal 
injury. The California Supreme Court stated: 
"It is obvious from the evidence that, before the blood sample 
was taken at the request of the highway patrolman, there was rea-
sonable cause to believe that defendant had committed the felony 
of which he was convicted, and he could have been lawfully ar-
rested at that time." 
The facts in the instant case are similar to those in the 
Duroncelay case, where the California Supreme Court 
found reasonable grounds for the arrest. The officer in the 
instant case also having reasonable grounds, the arrest and 
search were proper. 
D. THE SEARCH WAS PERMISSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE 
NATURE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES INVOLVED IN THE 
INSTANT CASE AND HAVING BEEN MADE UPON REA-
SONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE A CRIME HAD BEEN 
COMMITTED. 
In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 ( 1925) the 
United States Supreme Court recognized an exception to 
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the general rule that searches must be predicated on war-
rants or incident to arrest. The basis of the court's decision 
in that case is the acknowledgment that automobiles and 
motor vehicles are so mobile that special considerations 
warrant the application of a different rule. In Davis, Fed-
eral Searches and Seizures, Section 5.0 ( 1964) it is stated: 
"The search of conveyances is an exception to the general re-
quirl'ment that searches be conducted under the authority of a 
warrant. The right to search extends to vessels, vehicles and air-
craft; however, its greatest application is to automobiles. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the increasing use of automobiles and 
their adaptability for violating the National Prohibition Act, re-
sulted in the leading case of Carroll v. United States, 1925, 267 
U.S. 192, ·15 S.Ct. 280,69 L.Ed. 543. 
"The basis for the rule that conveyances may be searched 
without a warrant is their capacity for being quickly moved from 
one locality to another. This element of mobility makes it im-
practicable, if not impossible, to obtain a search warrant in most 
instances. In this respect, it must be remembered that a warrant 
may be required if the element of mobility is no longer present." 
See also 1 Harvard journal on Legislation, 51,55 (1964). 
In The Federal Law on Search and Seizure, F.B.I., 1962, 
p. 187, it is stated: 
"The Federal law allows search of a vehicle in a mobile condi-
tion on probable cause to believe that it contains something sub-
ject to seizure and destruction. Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 
( 1925) . Where such probable cause exists, a vehicle in a mobile 
condition may be searched without a search warrant, an arrest or 
a consent. In this respect, searches of vehicles are unique in the 
Federal law of search and seizure." 
Although the Carroll case seemed to have been rejected 
in United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 ( 1947), the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed the Carroll case in Brinegar v. the 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 149 and the Carroll decision 
may be clearly recognized as the law in the United States 
today. Reav. DnitedStates,255,F.2d473 (4thCir.l958). 
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United States v. One 1957 Ford Ranchero Pickup Truck, 
265 F.2d 21 (lOth Cir. 1959). Davis, supra, p. 219, 222. 
Speaking of the Carroll case, in Leagre, The Fourth 
Amendment and The Law of Arrest, 54 Journal of Crimi-
nal Law, Criminology and Police Science 393 ( 1963) at 
p. 399, it is stated: 
"* * * The first of these exceptions is found in Carroll v. United 
States~ which recognized the necessity for dispensing with the 
requirement of a warrant when moving vehicles were involved. 
The Court realized that insisting upon the requirement of a war-
rant in these circumstances would afford ample opportunity for 
the owner to remove his suspect automobile prior to the time the 
officers were authorized to search. This exception from the re-
quirement of a warrant was thus grounded on a showing of abso-
lute necessity on the facts of the particular case." 
The State submits that the instant situation presents a 
set of factual circumstances warranting the application of a 
doctrine similar to that in Carroll v. United States. In the 
instant case, at the time the officers arrived on the scene, 
they had reasonable grounds to believe a crime had been 
committed. However, humanitarian considerations war-
ranted swift action and warranted action other than the 
obtaining of a search warrant. First, the in jured passengers 
in the appellant's vehicle needed medical attention. Sec-
ond, the vehicles involved in the accident required removal 
and the normal flow of passage on the very busy street 
(State Street) had to be kept moving. Third, the appellant 
himself was in need of medical treatment. Fourth, the blood 
alcohol level varies in an individual case with time. The 
time necessary to procure a search warrant could have re-
sulted in additional absorption or dillution thus impeaching 
the validity of any blood alcohol test. A fortiori it was neces-
sary that the officers not stop to obtain a warrant under the 
circumstances. The conditions under which the blood alco-
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hol test was taken were reasonable, and consequently in 
accord with constitutional requirements. United States v. 
Rabinowitz, supra. In the instant case there was an "abso-
lute necessity" based upon "the facts of the particular case 
which necessitated action and dispensed with need for a 
search warrant." It is incongruous to argue that the officers 
should have taken the time to obtain a search warrant and 
thus neglect the appellant and passengers who were badly 
injured and at the same time to say that if they acted to save 
the lives of the passengers of appellant's vehicle and to 
render appropriate medical assistance to appellant that 
they are somehow precluded from obtaining the evidence 
revealed by blood alcohol tests. The extraction and test 
in the instant case were made at the most opportune time 
when the facts and exigencies of the case allowed.4 Conse-
quently, the search was reasonable and the Constitution de-
mands nothing else. State v. Louden, supra. The facts of 
this case should be deemed to allow an appropriate applica-
tion of the Carroll rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has challenged the admissibility of the 
results of a blood alcohol test performed on his blood on the 
grounds that the admission of such results violated his con-
stitutional right to be free from unwarranted search and 
• In opinion 62-058, the Attorney General stated that the rule in the Car-
roll case may well be applicable to the exigencies raised in the case of a blood 
alcohol test where the motorist or his passengers are injured. The Attorney 
General stated: 
"* * * It would seem the same rule should be applicable in the case of alco-
hol tests on motorists since alcohol concentration decreases with the pas-
sage of time, and often the necessity for immediate medical attention is 
present. Therefore, it would appear that the extraction of blood samples 
or other body fluids would be permissible if done when the officer has rea-
sonable belief of a crime being or having been committed. However, the 
test should be performed as soon as possible. * * *" 
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seizure. However, an analysis of the facts and the applica-
ble legal principles demonstrate that there are numerous 
legal bases which refute the claim of an unreasonable search 
in this case. This court should affirm the conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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